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Book	Review:	The	Polarizers:	Postwar	Architects	of
Our	Partisan	Era	by	Sam	Rosenfeld
In	The	Polarizers:	Postwar	Architects	of	Our	Partisan	Era,	Sam	Rosenfeld	offers	a	historical	account	of	how
polarisation	transformed	from	being	a	perceived	cure	to	a	poison	in	US	politics,	starting	with	the	Presidential	election
of	1952.	This	is	a	thorough	and	detailed	study	that	introduces	readers	to	the	myriad	figures	who	contributed	to	the
development	of	what	Rosenfeld	deems	the	‘polarization	without	responsibility’	of	our	present	times,	finds	Matthew	C.
Simpson.	
The	Polarizers:	Postwar	Architects	of	Our	Partisan	Era.	Sam	Rosenfeld.	University	of	Chicago	Press.	2018.
Find	this	book:	
In	September	1950,	a	committee	of	the	American	Political	Science	Association
(APSA)	published	a	report	highly	critical	of	political	parties	in	the	United	States.	Titled
‘Toward	a	More	Responsible	Two-Party	System’,	the	report	openly	questioned	the
ability	of	the	two	major	parties,	Democratic	and	Republican,	to	manage	post-war
governance,	and	it	predicted	a	fundamental	crisis	in	US	politics	unless	the	parties
could	be	reformed.	The	situation	was	so	dire,	in	their	view,	that	the	authors	directed
their	findings	not	to	other	scholars	but	to	party	leaders,	office	holders	and	‘everyone
interested	in	politics’	in	the	hope	of	bringing	about	‘a	fuller	public	appreciation	of	a
basic	weakness	in	the	American	two-party	system’.	And	what	was	this	weakness?
The	two	parties	were	insufficiently	polarised.	Because	nothing	distinguished	them
from	one	another,	they	failed	to	give	voters	a	real	choice	between	governing	agendas.
Viewed	from	nearly	70	years	on,	the	committee’s	argument	is	hard	to	believe	or	even
to	understand.	Today,	the	parties	in	Congress	are	so	at	odds	that	they	often	cannot
carry	out	the	basic	functions	of	American	government,	such	as	passing	budgets	and
confirming	presidential	appointees.	During	election	campaigns,	candidates	talk	about	their	opponents	as	if	they	were
members	of	a	malevolent	and	alien	species.	This	partisanship	among	elected	officials	is	increasingly	mirrored	in	the
electorate.	According	to	a	recent	study	by	the	Pew	Research	Center,	49	per	cent	of	Republicans	and	55	per	cent	of
Democrats	say	that	the	other	party	makes	them	‘feel	afraid’.	And	for	the	first	time	since	Pew	began	collecting	data,	a
majority	in	both	parties	expresses	a	‘very	unfavorable’	view	of	the	other.	New	book	The	Polarizers:	Postwar
Architects	of	our	Partisan	Era,	by	American	political	scientist	Sam	Rosenfeld,	tells	the	story,	or	part	of	the	story,	of
how	polarisation	transformed	from	a	cure	to	a	poison	in	US	politics.
Rosenfeld	begins	his	narrative	with	the	election	of	1952,	when	Democrats	lost	control	of	the	presidency	and	both
houses	of	Congress.	What	is	hard	to	grasp	about	mid-century	American	election	campaigns	is	that	the	political
parties	of	the	time	were	nonideological.	For	example,	the	most	outspoken	civil	rights	leaders	as	well	as	the	most
strident	segregationists	were	members	of	the	Democratic	Party.	Similarly,	liberal	Republicans	were	to	the	left	of
conservative	Democrats	on	issues	such	as	women’s	rights	and	environmental	protection.	From	the	APSA’s
perspective,	the	problem	with	the	post-war	party	system	was	that	voters	had	no	clear	choice	between	policy
platforms	because	both	parties	made	room	for	conservative	and	liberal	views.	From	the	Democrat’s	perspective,
however,	the	problem	was	that	there	seemed	to	be	no	ready	way	to	win	back	the	presidency	and	Congress	when
nothing	distinguished	them	from	Republicans.
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Paul	Butler,	a	leader	in	the	Democratic	Party	and	future	chairman	of	the	Democratic	National	Committee,	felt	the
weight	of	both	problems.	As	an	ardent	New	Deal	liberal,	he	wanted	the	Democratic	Party	to	stand	unambiguously
against	segregation	and	for	the	rights	of	workers	and	minorities.	As	party	leader,	he	wanted	to	win	elections.	Perhaps
he	could	accomplish	both	goals	by	transforming	the	Democratic	Party	from	a	coalition	of	diverse,	self-seeking
candidates	into	a	disciplined,	ideological	instrument	of	progressivism	akin	to	Clement	Atlee’s	Labour	Party	in	Britain.
Butler	met	resistance	both	from	Southern	Democrats	who	opposed	civil	rights	and	from	big	tent	Democrats	who	were
happy	to	see	policy	positions	change	from	one	congressional	district	to	the	next,	or	one	election	cycle	to	the	next,	as
long	as	they	put	Democrats	in	office.	His	opposition	was	embodied	in	the	formidable	figure	of	Senator	Lyndon	B.
Johnson	who	said:	‘what	the	man	on	the	street	wants	is	not	a	big	debate	on	fundamental	issues;	he	wants	a	little
medical	care,	a	rug	on	the	floor,	a	picture	on	the	wall.’	Johnson	added:	‘The	biggest	threat	to	American	stability	is	the
politics	of	principle.’
Butler’s	vision	gradually	won	out	and,	perhaps	as	a	consequence,	the	liberal	side	of	the	Democratic	Party
increasingly	dominated	national	politics	in	the	late	1950s	and	1960s.	Republicans	needed	a	response	to	the
Democratic	surge,	yet	many	of	their	leaders	shared	Johnson’s	concern	about	the	‘politics	of	principle’.	As	late	as
1959,	former	Republican	congressman	Robert	Goodwin	made	the	argument	that	‘it	is	neither	possible	nor	desirable
for	a	major	political	party	to	be	guided	by	principles’.	He	continued:	‘It	is	a	good	thing	for	the	nation	as	a	whole	that
neither	of	our	two	major	parties	stands	for	anything	in	particular.’	Yet	by	the	1964	presidential	contest	between
Johnson	and	Barry	Goldwater,	ideology	was	coming	to	define	both	major	parties.
Rosenfeld	introduces	the	reader,	year	by	year,	to	the	Democratic	and	Republican	leaders	who	planned	and	deployed
the	modern	‘politics	of	principle’	up	through	to	the	election	of	2016.	Much	of	the	pleasure	of	the	book	is	in	becoming
acquainted	or	reacquainted	with	figures	such	as	the	left-wing	intellectual	Michael	Harrington	and	Tennessee
Republican	Bill	Brock	who,	along	with	more	famous	characters	like	House	speakers	Tip	O’Neill	and	Newt	Gingrich,
shaped	the	politics	of	ideological	polarisation.	A	possible	criticism	of	Rosenfeld’s	book	is	that	he	treats	polarisation	as
the	creation	of	a	few	political	elites	without	saying	much	about	the	economic	and	social	conditions	that	made
ideological	politics	possible	and	effective,	such	as	increasing	immigration,	the	legacy	of	Jim	Crow,	media	bubbles,
self-segregation	and	a	stalled	standard	of	living.	In	any	case,	by	the	latter	chapters	of	Rosenfeld’s	story,	the	dream
articulated	in	‘Toward	a	More	Responsible	Two-Party	System’	has	largely	come	true.	After	the	year	2000	or	so,	when
candidates	told	you	their	position	on	any	issue,	you	not	only	knew	what	party	they	belonged	to,	you	also	knew	where
they	stood	on	every	other	issue.	And	when	in	power,	parties	would	regularly	violate	procedural	norms	and	traditions
in	order	to	turn	their	platform	into	law.
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Early-twenty-first-century	political	parties	were	perhaps	the	most	‘responsible’	in	American	history.	So	why	is	US
politics	such	a	mess	today?	The	answer,	in	part,	is	that	the	critics	of	the	‘politics	of	principle’	had	a	good	argument.
The	US	constitutional	system	has	an	exorbitant	number	of	veto	points,	or	places	where	individuals	and	minority
groups	can	derail	the	policy	preferences	of	the	majority.	Even	very	popular	measures	can	be	stopped	by	a
presidential	veto,	a	Senate	filibuster,	a	Supreme	Court	ruling,	uncooperative	state	or	local	governments,	among
others.	The	elaborate	system	of	checks	and	balances	and	the	separation	of	powers	demand	a	political	culture	of
moderation,	compromise	and	cooperation.
In	a	politics	organised	around	ideology,	however,	the	opposition	can	come	to	seem	not	just	mistaken	but	evil,	and
cooperation	can	be	judged	as	collusion.	Writing	on	this	topic	in	1960,	the	sociologist	Daniel	Bell	noted:	‘The	tendency
to	convert	concrete	issues	into	ideological	problems,	to	invest	them	with	moral	color	and	high	emotional	charge,	is	to
invite	conflicts	that	can	only	damage	society.’	In	the	extreme	case,	which	in	fact	exists	today,	defeating	the	enemy
becomes	more	important	than	advancing	one’s	own	agenda.	The	perverse	effect	of	injecting	ideology	into	US	party
politics	has	been	that	achieving	an	ideologically	coherent	policy	outcome	no	longer	matters	as	long	as	the	other	party
appears	to	have	lost	the	latest	battle.	Rosenfeld	calls	this	newest	form	of	the	party	system	‘polarization	without
responsibility’.	In	2013,	the	APSA	published	a	new	report	urging	American	political	actors	to	be	less	rather	than	more
polarised.	We	can	only	hope	that	its	dream	also	comes	true.
Matthew	C.	Simpson	holds	a	PhD	in	philosophy	from	Boston	University.	He	teaches	American	politics	at	the
University	of	New	Mexico.	Twitter:	@mattcsimpson
Note:	This	review	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	LSE	Review	of	Books	blog,	or	of	the
London	School	of	Economics.	
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